Practical Ethics and Profound Emptiness Page 11
When the Sutra Unraveling the Thought says the two truths are not different, it means they are not different natures; they are one nature. They cannot exist separate from each other. When it says that they are not the same, it means that they do not have the same isolate — they are nominally different. It is in this sense that they are neither the same nor different. The two truths are the same nature and nominally different. All of the great Indian sages and scholars explained it like this. Similarly, the correct understanding of “neither existent nor nonexistent” is that phenomena are neither inherently existent nor totally nonexistent — they are empty of inherent existence and exist nominally.
58.Asserting neither existence nor nonexistence
by knowing [reality] just as it is,
[if you think such wise persons] are thereby nihilists,
why wouldn’t you also be essentialists?
Dispelling Confusion Regarding the Correct View
Non-Buddhists and proponents of the lower Buddhist tenet systems believe that the Prasangika’s example of the mirage shows that nothing exists inherently, and that therefore things don’t exist at all. They then accuse Nagarjuna of being a nihilist.
In response, Nagarjuna uses an identical reasoning, “If you say our assertion that phenomena aren’t inherently existent makes us nihilists, then by asserting that everything exists inherently, wouldn’t you fall to the extreme of absolutism and thereby become essentialists?” The proponents of lower Buddhist systems don’t like this, because they consider their position to be the middle way.
Negating inherent existence doesn’t make someone a nihilist, and asserting the conventional existence of the Three Jewels, the law of cause and effect, and so on doesn’t make someone an essentialist. You can negate inherent existence while still establishing the existence of the Three Jewels and so forth. Phenomena exist conventionally, by being merely designated, and at the same time they lack inherent existence.
There is another way to read this verse. Here Nagarjuna replies to the non-Buddhists and proponents of lower systems’ accusation that he is a nihilist by saying, “Why don’t you also accuse me of being an essentialist who has fallen to the extreme of existence because I assert that phenomena exist?” The previous way to read this verse is deeper and clearer.
59.If the refutation of existence
were to entail nihilism by implication
then why isn’t absolutism entailed
by the refutation of nonexistence?
As in the previous verses, here “existence” refers to inherent existence and “nonexistence” to total nonexistence. Apprehending the world as either inherently existent or as totally nonexistent is ignorant. However, Svatantrikas and below assert that when inherent existence is refuted, existence is refuted and total nonexistence is established. For this reason they say Prasangikas are nihilists. Nagarjuna replies that if by refuting inherent existence he falls to the extreme of nihilism, then by refuting total nonexistence why wouldn’t you fall to the extreme of absolutism? In other words, if his refutation of inherent existence makes him a nihilist, their assertion that things exist should make them essentialists. This is the same argument as in the previous verse.
According to Nagarjuna’s system, asserting that things don’t exist inherently is not nihilism and saying that they exist conventionally is not absolutism. Even though all phenomena are not inherently existent, Prasangikas can still present the entire system of agent, action, and object, and of cause and effect. When they accuse us of being nihilists, non-Buddhists and proponents of the lower Buddhist systems have misunderstood emptiness and the actual meaning of the middle way.
You may have noticed that Nagarjuna makes the same point many times, approaching it from different perspectives each time. He does that so that we will understand the importance of differentiating between conventional existence and inherent existence, affirming the former and refuting the latter. Similarly, we must not confuse emptiness with total nonexistence and must affirm the former and negate the latter.
60.[Prasangikas] do not actually assert nihilism,
nor behave nihilistically;
and because they rely on awakening, they do not think as nihilists,
so how can they be called nihilists?
Realizing Freedom from Elaborations Is Not Nihilism
Some of the verses in Precious Garland imply a dialogue between Prasangikas and proponents of other systems. Sometimes the other proponents are identified, sometimes it just says, “Somebody says . . .” The following exchange principally refutes the idea of some hearers who accept that karma and its effects exist inherently. They misunderstand Prasangikas’ negation of inherent existence to mean that they deny karma and its effects altogether and thus think they are nihilists.
Those following the hearer vehicle say, “Although you don’t say that you deny the existence of karma and its effects, through your physical behavior it seems that you do.” To this, Prasangikas reply, “While we assert that phenomena, such as the law of karma and its effects, are not inherently existent, we never say that they are totally nonexistent. We stopped all faulty behavior, so our physical conduct and our speech are not like that of nihilists.”
Altering their accusation a little, the followers of the hearer vehicle retort, “You don’t speak or act like nihilists because you are worried about not receiving as many offerings and as much respect. To prevent that from happening, you make sure that your outer behavior doesn’t accord with that of nihilists, but inside you still think there is no law of karma and its effects.” To this, Prasangikas reply, “We have perfectly realized the path to awakening, and thus understand karma and its effects correctly. We don’t deny their existence.”
This is a subtle point, because everyone from the Svatantrikas downward says that if karma and its results — or anything else for that matter — does not inherently exist, it does not exist at all. The assertion that phenomena can lack inherent existence yet still exist is a unique feature of the Prasangikas.
61.Ask the worldly [philosophers, such as] the Samkhyas, Vaisheshikas, and Jains,
who assert [the real existence] of the person and aggregates,
whether they maintain that
[the interdependent is] beyond existence and nonexistence.
62.Realize, therefore, that the nectar of the Buddha’s teaching,
which is beyond all notions of existence and nonexistence,
and which is called the profound,
is [our] unique Dharma inheritance.
Only the Buddha Spoke of Freedom from the Two Extremes
To know if the assertion that phenomena lack inherent existence but exist conventionally is the unique quality of the Prasangikas, ask non-Buddhist philosophers and proponents of the lower Buddhist tenet systems if they have this quality. They will respond that they do not. Even our fellow Buddhists, let alone the non-Buddhists, cannot explain this point.
The Samkhya (followers of Kapila) was a prominent non-Buddhist school in ancient India, as was the Vaisheshika (followers of Kanada), the Naiyayikas who were associated with them, and the Jains (Nirgranthas, or Unclad Ones). Followers of these philosophical systems assert that persons and phenomena are substantially existent; they do not understand the profound phenomenon of the emptiness of inherent existence. If you discuss with them, you will find out for yourself that they don’t talk about the unique Prasangika attribute of dependent arising free of the two extremes.
When you carefully examine and understand this profound Dharma free of absolutism and nihilism, you will see how precious and important it is. Then put in the effort to become learned in it, leaving far behind all ideas of a truly existent ultimate reality, a permanent, unitary, and independent self, and permanent tiniest particles that are the building blocks of all existents.
Nirvana, the nectar of immortality, is beyond birth, aging, sickness, and death; the Buddha’s teachings on nirvana are unrivaled. The path for attaining it is the unpolluted ar
ya path: the true path, which is the fourth of the four truths. The apprehended object of the true path — the emptiness of inherent existence — is profound and free of the extreme views of existence and nonexistence. This is our unique Buddhist heritage that the Buddha set forth with compassion.
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6.There are two levels of grasping: innate and acquired. Innate grasping has existed beginninglessly in the mindstreams of ordinary beings and automatically goes from one life to the next. Acquired grasping is learned through contact with incorrect philosophies and psychological theories. Acquired grasping is easier to eliminate on the path; innate grasping is much more difficult to eradicate.
7.A sentient being is any being with a mind except for buddhas. The continuum of a sentient being is the psychophysical continuity of that sentient being that exists over time.
8.The conceived object is the main object with which a conceptual consciousness is concerned. For conceptual consciousnesses, it is the same as the apprehended object. Self-grasping is erroneous with respect to its conceived object.
9.See Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1983), 131–50, for more on this reasoning. See also rJe Tsong Khapa, Ocean of Reasoning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 47–49.
10.See Tsongkhapa’s refutation of nirvana as a thing or non-thing in Tsong Khapa, Ocean of Reasoning, 521–55. Also see Daniel Cozort’s Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1998), 394–95.
11.Here “non-things” means nonexistents.
12.See Cozort, Unique Tenets, 253–55.
13.See Tsong Khapa, Ocean of Reasoning, 417–18.
14.See Tsongkhapa’s “Praise to Dependent Arising.” Several English translations are available.
4. Refuting Inherent Existence and Establishing Emptiness
OVERCOMING WRONG VIEWS ABOUT REALITY
Nagarjuna now leads us deeper into the nature of reality. He destroys our wrong views and true-grasping by refuting coming and going as existent from their own side and by refuting the inherent existence of momentary, impermanent things. He also introduces us to the refutation of things being either one or many.
63.The world does not go out of existence
nor come [into existence]:
it does not remain for even an instant;
it has a nature beyond the three times, so how could it be real?
Refuting that Coming and Going Exist from Their Own Side
This refutation of inherently existent coming and going is similar to that found in chapter 2 of Nagarjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way.15 The world here refers particularly to the aggregates that are the basis of designation of the person, but it also includes outer phenomena such as the environment that are not associated with the person. The aggregates do not arise, remain, or disintegrate from their own side, independent of all other factors. In this way they have a nature beyond the three times of past, present, and future.
If the mind, for example, existed inherently, it could not come to this life from a previous one or go to a future life after death, because whatever exists inherently is unchanging. It could not interact with other factors, so it could not change, and coming and going from one life to the next involves change. An inherently existent mind would be frozen in time and remain unchanging throughout the past, present, or future.
If cause and effect existed inherently, they would exist independent of each other. In that case, an effect could exist at the time of its cause, and a cause would not have to cease in order to produce its effect. Furthermore, both a cause and its effect could exist in the past, present, and future simultaneously.
When the aggregates arise, they don’t come unchanged from somewhere else; when they cease, they don’t go somewhere else unchanged; and in the moment after they arise, they don’t endure unchanged. Our body, for example, is not a permanent phenomenon that exists fully formed in the previous moment and comes into the next moment without changing. Rather, the body changes in each moment, never remaining the same. Things with such an impermanent nature depend on causes and conditions, therefore they do not exist independently or inherently. Thus the aggregates do not have a nature that exists autonomously in the past, present, or future. For that reason, they have a nature that transcends inherent existence in any of the three times.
If the body existed inherently, it would have to exist in the past, present, or future. If it existed in the future, it would have to stay in the future; a present body could not come about. Furthermore, an inherently existent future body would already have attained its entity, which means it would be a present object. Something that has attained its own entity — something that exists in the present — doesn’t need to arise; it already exists, and in that case, it could not be a future object.
If the body were inherently a present object, it wouldn’t have a past or future. Without a future, it could not come into existence, and without a past, it could not cease. If it were inherently a past body, it would be frozen in the past and could never have been a present body.
Conditioned things do not abide for an instant — they change even as they arise. Because they do not stay fixed, they are beyond abiding in any of the three times. Inherently existent things would have to exist as findable entities in the past, present, or future, which would preclude their momentary change. Since they don’t exist in this way, how could they be real?
Treatise on the Middle Way speaks of the agent and the action of going. A person (the agent) walks from here to there (the action). A person also goes from one life to the next. However, neither the person nor the action of going is an inherently existent entity. There is no going and no one who goes over the part of the path that has already been traversed. That going and goer don’t exist right now. Similarly, there is no goer or going on the part of the path yet to come in the future, because that hasn’t happened yet. Neither an inherently existent action of going nor the goer who is the agent can exist in the future.
With respect to the part of the path that is presently being traversed, there is no inherently existent going or goer. The action of going involves lifting one foot up and putting it down, picking up the other and putting it down. Which one of these movements is the action of going? As soon as one foot moves in the smallest instant, that action of going has ceased and the next action of going is yet to come. So where is an inherently existent present moment in which going occurs? It is unfindable.
The present is posited in relation to the past and the future; the three times are mutually dependent on each other, so they don’t exist independently or inherently. In short, the action of going can’t inherently exist in the future because that action of going is yet to come. It can’t exist in the past, because it has already ceased, and it can’t exist in the present because the present cannot be pinpointed.
64.Ultimately, the world and nirvana do not come [into existence],
nor do they go [out of existence], nor do they remain [existent].
So what kind of distinction could there really be
between the world and nirvana?
Here, the world refers to cyclic existence. Cyclic existence and nirvana do not inherently come into existence or inherently go out of existence. They also do not remain in an inherently existent manner. On the ultimate level, there is no difference between cyclic existence and nirvana in terms of their being empty of inherent existence.
Furthermore, cyclic existence and nirvana are posited in relation to each other. Being mutually dependent, they do not exist independently or inherently; in this way, too, they are equal in terms of being empty.
Some scriptures speak of “the equality of samsara and nirvana.” If we misunderstand this phrase we may think, “Samsara (cyclic existence) and nirvana are exactly the same. Since samsara is already nirvana, there’s no need to practice ethical conduct or restrain my desires.” A person who acts with such a belief creates a lot of destructive karma beca
use he or she ignores the law of karma and its effects. Furthermore, if such a person teaches this wrong view to others, he or she will lead them into the thick jungle of suffering like the first cow in a herd who takes a wrong path.
The proper way to understand the equality of samsara and nirvana is to know that both of them lack inherent existence and are established nominally in mutual dependence on each other. Since they both lack inherent existence and are not frozen entities, it is important to practice the path to overcome samsara and attain nirvana.
65.Since abiding does not [really] occur,
ultimately there is neither arising nor cessation.
How can [something] ultimately arise,
or cease, or abide?
Refuting the Inherent Existence of Arising, Abiding, and Ceasing
Now Nagarjuna refutes the inherent existence of three attributes of impermanent things — their arising, abiding, and ceasing.16 We usually think these three occur sequentially: first something arises or is produced, then it abides, and finally it ceases. In fact, these three occur simultaneously in one object. Arising is the new production of what didn’t exist before. Abiding is the persistence of a previous continuum. Ceasing is a thing’s not lasting for a second moment after it arises.
When we negate inherently existent arising, abiding, and ceasing, we can pick any one of the three, show that it doesn’t exist inherently, and use that as the reason to prove that the others also do not exist inherently. For example, if arising existed from its own side, then the object that is arising — let’s say a sprout — would do so without depending on any other factors, such as its cause. Not depending on anything else, the sprout would be permanent and unable to change, so its abiding and ceasing could not occur. An inherently existent sprout would be frozen in time and space, unable to function.